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論　説
KANT AND THE LAW OF NATIONS＊
Charles COVELL
 Of the thinkers belonging to the Western tradition in political thought, Immanuel Kant 
(₁₇₂₄-₁₈₀₄) stands out by virtue of the attention that he devoted to politics in its 
international form and dimensions. The sphere of international politics, as Kant conceived 
of it, was primarily the sphere of the co-existence of states, and Kant attended to this sphere 
of politics for the reason that it was his conviction that peace was to be thought of as the 
supreme moral-political good. The peace that Kant regarded as the supreme moral-political 
good was a peace among men and states, and this he saw as requiring the establishing 
among men and states of a speciﬁcally juridical condition of society. That is to say, Kant 
saw peace among men and states as requiring the acceptance by men and states of the 
constraints and limitations of law as for the regulation of their mutual relations. 
 The law that, for Kant, served to provide for peace among men and states was the law 
of peace. The latter, in Kant＇s political thought, was a system of law that included each of 
what he identified as the three basic parts of public law, and together with the forms of 
lawful constitution that he held were to found the different parts of public law. First, there 
was municipal law. This was the law maintained for the government of men in the condition 
of the civil state. The municipal law of the state was to be founded in a form of lawful 
constitution that Kant called the republican civil constitution. Second, there was the law of 
nations. This was the form of international law that laid down the basic rights and 
obligations of states and rulers in the sphere of their mutual external relations. The law of 
＊　The present work is based on a paper that the author delivered at the University of Tokyo, as 
through the kind invitation of Professor Yasuaki Onuma, on ₁₈ January ₂₀₀₀. In its essentials, the 
paper is unchanged from its original form. However, some alterations have been made in order to 
clarify the sense and meaning of the argument of the paper, as well as for the sake of style, and with 
certain minor additions having been made to the body of the text where necessary. The paper now 
includes full and detailed notes and references. Charles Covell: ₁₈ August ₂₀₁₅. 
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nations was to have as its constitutional foundation a form of organized association among 
states that Kant referred to as the federation of free states. Third, there was the cosmopolitan 
law. This was a distinct form of international law that Kant presented as providing for, 
among other things, a proper juridical framework for the trade and commerce of men and 
nations as within the international sphere. Kant was apt to write of cosmopolitan law as 
implying the possibility of a lawful constitution that was to unite all men and states within a 
universal juridical community that would come to extend itself to comprehend the whole of 
humanity. However, the precise form of this constitution was left unspeciﬁed, save that Kant 
afﬁrmed that the cosmopolitan law was to be based in what he saw as the right of men to be 
treated with hospitality when entering into foreign lands. 
 In this paper, the discussion is conﬁned essentially to Kant＇s statement and explanation 
of what he presented as the substantive principles of the law of nations. In this, there is the 
attempt made to say something about the respects in which Kant conformed with the earlier 
writers on the law of nations, and the respects in which he diverged from them. In particular, 
it is considered how Kant conformed with, and how he departed from, the established just 
war doctrine as this had been set out by the classic writers on the subject, such as St 
Augustine (₃₅₄-₄₃₀) and St Thomas Aquinas (₁₂₂₄/₅-₇₄). There is also to be considered 
the standing of Kant as in reference to the modern secular natural law thinkers as including 
Thomas Hobbes (₁₅₈₈-₁₆₇₉), as well as those who carried forward the tradition of just war 
theorizing such as Hugo Grotius (₁₅₈₃-₁₆₄₅), Samuel Pufendorf (₁₆₃₂-₉₄) and Emmerich 
de Vattel (₁₇₁₄-₆₇): and with the latter being the thinkers whom Kant famously condemned 
as sorry comforters and from whose projects in international law he explicitly differentiated 
his own. At the same time, the discussion of Kant on the principles of the law of nations is 
intended to bring out something of his anticipation of the now existing system of 
international law and its foundational principles. In this connection, it will be emphasized to 
what extent Kant thought of the law of nations as a body of law that worked to deﬁne the 
rights and obligations of states that were essential to their freedom and independence, and 
hence to what extent he thought of peace among men and states as presupposing the 
establishing of a state-centred system of international law. The state-centredness of the law 
of nations, as in Kant＇s account of it, is crucial in explaining the direction of his international 
thought, as when, towards the end of the paper, some detailed attention is given to the forms 
21
KANT AND THE LAW OF NATIONS （COVELL）
of lawful constitution that Kant took to found the different parts of the law of peace. As for 
the focus of the critical expository attention of the paper, this lies with the two works where 
Kant stated and elaborated on what he saw as the substantive principles of the law of 
nations: Perpetual Peace (₁₇₉₅) and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, the latter being 
the ﬁrst part of the late treatise The Metaphysics of Morals (₁₇₉₇). 1
i. 
 Kant wrote Perpetual Peace in the form of an imaginary treaty that was to provide for 
the establishing of perpetual peace. This treaty was divided into two sections, and with each 
containing certain articles of peaceful association. In the second section, Kant set down 
three definitive articles of perpetual peace between states, which related to the forms of 
lawful constitution that were to found municipal law, the law of nations and cosmopolitan 
law. In the first section of Perpetual Peace, Kant set down six preliminary articles of 
perpetual peace between states. It was claimed by Kant that the principles stipulated with 
1 　Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Kant, Political Writings, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss, ₂nd edition, enlarged (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ₁₉₉₁), pp. 
₉₃-₁₃₀; The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Part ₁ of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. John 
Ladd (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, ₁₉₆₅). For the view of the present author on Kant 
and the speciﬁcally jurisprudential aspects of his international thought, see: Charles Covell: Kant, 
Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice in the International Order (Münster and Hamburg: Lit, ₁₉₉₄); 
Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International 
Relations (London: Macmillan; New York: St Martin＇s Press, ₁₉₉₈); The Law of Nations in Political 
Thought: A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Hegel (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, ₂₀₀₉), Chapter ₅, pp. ₁₆₁-₈₉. The classic statement of the principles of justice in war by 
Aquinas, as basing himself on Augustine, comes in the discussion of the subject in his treatise the 
Summa Theologiae, and with this to be found in Question ₄₀ of the second sub-part of the Second 
Part of the work that is known as the Secunda Secundae. For the original Latin text of this with an 
English translation by Thomas R. Heath, see: Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars edition, Volume ₃₅: 
Consequences of Charity (New York: McGraw-Hill; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, ₁₉₇₂), pp. ₈₀-
₉₃. Regarding Hobbes, see: Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civil, edited with an Introduction by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, ₁₉₄₆). For the work of Grotius＇ to which reference is made in the paper, see: De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis Libri Tres (₁₆₄₆ edition), trans. Francis W. Kelsey et al., The Classics of International Law, 
No. ₃, Volume ₂ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ₁₉₂₅). As to Vattel, see: Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes 
de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains (₁₇₅₈ 
edition), trans. Charles G. Fenwick, The Classics of International Law, No. ₄, Volume ₃ (Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, ₁₉₁₆). 
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the preliminary articles had the status of prohibitive laws, and it is clear that these articles 
comprise what Kant thought were to stand as the fundamental principles of the law of 
nations. 
 The first preliminary article provided that peace treaties entered into with secret 
reservations as regarding the material for future wars were to be considered as invalid. 2  The 
place and signiﬁcance of the principle stated in this article in relation to the law of nations 
need little explanation. For the principle that peace agreements made with secret 
reservations were to be excluded as invalid had been recognized prior to Kant; and, beyond 
this, it is to be observed that in excluding agreements with mental reservations, Kant gave 
recognition to the more basic and underlying principle of international law as to the effect 
that agreements between states were to be entered into and kept by them in good faith. 3  The 
principle of good faith is foundational within the law of nations, and it is enshrined in 
current international law in the rule pacta sunt servanda: that is, the rule that treaties are 
binding upon the states that are the parties to them, and that the parties are bound in good 
faith to the performance of their terms. 4
 The second preliminary article provided that no independently existing state, whatever 
its size, was to be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift. 
In the view of Kant, the disposing of the state through transactions such as inheritance, 
exchange, purchase or gift implied that the state was to be thought of as a possession or 
patrimonium, rather than as an association of men that was entitled to command and to 
dispose of itself. 5  The conception of the state as a possession or patrimony, and hence as the 
subject of the proprietary rights vested in its ruler, was fundamentally alien to the conception 
2 　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₉₃-₄. 
3 　Grotius elaborated the principles of good faith in detail and at length: De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 
Book III, Chapters XIX-XXIV. As for Vattel, he denounced treaties made with mental reservations as 
a form of deception: Le Droit des Gens, Book II, Chapter XVII, Section ₂₇₅. 
4 　The rule pacta sunt servanda is afﬁrmed in Article ₂₆ of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (₁₉₆₉), and the duty of states to fulfil their obligations in good faith is affirmed as the 
Seventh Principle laid down in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (₁₉₇₀). For the texts of the Declaration and the Vienna Convention, see: Basic Documents in 
International Law, ed. Ian Brownlie, ₄th edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ₁₉₉₅), pp. ₃₆-₄₅, pp. 
₃₈₈-₄₂₅.
5 　Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. ₉₄. 
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of the state that Kant argued for in Perpetual Peace, and that he was to elaborate at some 
length in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Thus Kant conceived of the state as an 
association of men that was sovereign unto itself, and as where its sovereignty was 
embodied in the collective person of its members as a citizen-body. As for the basis of the 
association formed among men within the state, this, for Kant, lay in the public law rather 
than in private law rights as relating to the conditions for the ownership of property: and 
with the public law comprising universal laws that were to be maintained on behalf of the 
citizen-body as sovereign by rulers whose ofﬁce and authorized constitutional powers were 
founded in the principle of representation. 6
 The declared opposition of Kant to patrimonial principles of statehood underlines his 
commitment to republican constitutionalism. It underlines also his alignment with the 
writers on the law of nations who came before him. It is true that Grotius had famously 
accepted the legitimacy of states where the sovereign power was held with full proprietary 
right, and hence in patrimony. 7  However, Vattel had been clear, as Kant was after him, that 
the state was not to be thought of as the patrimony of its ruler: and as for the reason that the 
ruler of the state was a representative person, and with this being so even when the ruler 
happened to be an hereditary ruler. 8  The second preliminary article also points to the fact of 
Kant＇s anticipation of the international law of the contemporary era. For as Kant explained 
it, the article carried the implication that fundamental alterations to the status and position of 
a state within the international order as affecting its rights and independence, and 
fundamental alterations to the form of government that determined the system of its internal 
domestic political organization, were to take place only in accordance with the consent of 
the people who comprised its citizen-body. Here, Kant gave provisional expression to the 
essential meaning of what in the twentieth century was to come to gain acceptance in 
international law as the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. This 
is the principle that provides for the right of peoples to determine for themselves their own 
political status and their own form of self-government. 9  
6 　For Kant＇s arguments here, see: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, The General Theory of 
Justice, Part II: Public Law, Section I: Municipal Law, sub-sections ₄₅-₄₉, ₅₀-₅₂. 
7 　Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, I.III, Sections XI-XII. 
8 　Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, I.IV.₄₀; I.V.₅₆-₆₁, ₆₈-₆₉. 
9 　The principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples stands as the Fifth Principle 
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 Kant characterized the principle stated in the ﬁrst preliminary article of perpetual peace 
as a principle of law that had the standing of a strict prohibitive law. This meant that it was a 
law that was to have immediate effect, and to apply to all relevant cases without regard for 
actual circumstances. In contrast to this, the principle stated with the second preliminary 
article stood as a principle of law that was characterized by Kant as a law that permitted 
some measure of latitude in its application as determined by contingent circumstances, and 
which for this reason allowed for some delay in its practical implementation. 
 The third and fourth preliminary articles of perpetual peace were similar to the second 
preliminary article in that the principles that they stipulated were considered by Kant to 
have the status of laws that allowed for delay as to the implementation of their terms. The 
third preliminary article provided that the standing armies of states were to be abolished on 
a gradual basis.10 The fourth preliminary article provided that states were not to contract 
national debts as in connection with the prosecution of their external policies.11 It is clear 
that the principles laid down with the third and fourth preliminary articles have not acquired 
the status of rules of international law as such, and that, in this respect, the implementation 
of the principles contained in the articles has been put off for a very long time. Even so, the 
principles at issue have certainly come to be accepted as general principles of international 
conduct whose observance by states and governments is recognized to be conducive to the 
maintenance of international peace. Thus the principle that states should abolish their 
standing armies implies that international peace must depend on the preparedness of states 
to give up the means at their disposal to wage aggressive war against one another: an 
implication that stands conﬁrmed as with the policies of states that are aimed at establishing 
mutual disarmament treaties, and aimed at establishing arms control regimes and so on. As 
for the fourth preliminary article, this points in the direction of what is now recognized as 
the principle of conditionality: that is, the principle that provides that credit is to be extended 
to states and governments only subject to restrictions as to the speciﬁc uses to which it may 
set out in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States. The principle is also afﬁrmed in Article ₁, paragraph ₂ of the Charter of the 
United Nations (₁₉₄₅). For the text of the United Nations Charter, see: Brownlie (ed.), Basic 
Documents in International Law, pp. ₁-₃₅. 
10　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₉₄-₅. 
11　Ibid., p. ₉₅.  
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be put.12 
 The ﬁfth preliminary article of perpetual peace was one that stipulated a principle of 
the law of nations that Kant presented as imposing a strict prohibition as to the conditions 
for its application. The law set down in the article is central as to Kant＇s exposition of the 
principles of the law of nations. For it is with this article that there is brought out that Kant 
thought of the law of nations as a body of law that served to guarantee the rights of states, 
and such as were essential to their freedom and independence as states. As to its speciﬁcs, 
the ﬁfth preliminary article provided that no state was to interfere forcibly in the constitution 
and government of other states. For Kant, the principle of non-interference as set out in the 
article was overriding and unconditional, as in the sense that it underlined that, prima facie, 
there could be no justiﬁcation whatsoever for the interference by one state in the constitution 
and government of another state as by the means of force. Kant allowed that where a state 
had split into two parts as the result of some internal conﬂict, then it was not necessarily to 
be counted as an interference in the constitution and government of the state in question if 
an external power were to intervene through providing support to one or other of the parties 
to the conﬂict. However, Kant insisted that until such time as the conﬂict had been decided, 
then any such interference by external powers would constitute a violation of the right to 
independence of the people among whom the conflict was taking place, and so would 
threaten the interests of all states through the rendering of their mutual independence 
insecure.13 
 It is evident that Kant looked back to the past with the fifth preliminary article of 
perpetual peace. So, for example, Vattel had afﬁrmed that states possessed the right to draw 
up their own constitution, and to regulate all matters relating to their own government, and 
to do this without interference from foreign powers.14 There is also, once again, an evident 
12　Thus it may be observed that the third and fourth preliminary articles of perpetual peace set out 
principles of international conduct that conform with the spirit, and the meaning, of the obligations 
falling on states to refrain from the threat or use of force and to co-operate with one another which 
are laid down, respectively, as the First Principle and the Fourth Principle afﬁrmed in the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. 
13　Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. ₉₆. 
14　Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, I.III.₃₁, ₃₇; II.IV.₅₄-₅₅. It is to be noted, however, that Vattel allowed 
for rather more scope for intervention by foreign powers than Kant was to do after him. For he 
accepted that a foreign power might assist an oppressed people engaged in waging a war of resistance 
against a tyrannical ruler, albeit subject to the condition that the people concerned had requested it to 
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anticipation by Kant of the current system of international law. Here, it is to be emphasized 
that the principle of non-interference stipulated in the fifth preliminary article was a 
principle that implied, and that followed from, the acceptance of the possession by states of 
the formal rights and attributes of sovereignty. Thus the principle of non-interference, as laid 
down in the article, was such that it served to guarantee the freedom and independence of 
states as in regard to their internal constitution and government. At the same time, the 
principle was such that it served to give recognition to the formal juridical equality of states, 
as in the respect that the freedom from external interference that the principle guaranteed to 
states was a freedom that was to be guaranteed to all states equally and without exception. It 
is concerning this aspect of it, as through its implications for the idea of state sovereignty in 
relation to the law of nations, that the ﬁfth preliminary article of perpetual peace testiﬁes to 
the fact of Kant as looking forward to the international law system of the contemporary 
period. For the principle that Kant afﬁrmed to the effect that states were to be prohibited 
from forcible external interference in the constitution and government of one another 
answers, as to its essential meaning, to the principle, as fundamental to present international 
law, as to the effect that states remain subject to a duty of non-interference, or non-
intervention, as in regard to the area of the exclusive jurisdiction exercised by other states. 
This duty of non-interference is an integral part of the general conception of state 
sovereignty that informs current international law, and it is a duty that follows as a 
consequence of the sovereignty and equality of states as this is considered to stand as the 
basic constitutional principle of international law as such.15 
 Finally, there was the sixth preliminary article of perpetual peace. This provided that 
states at war were not to commit such acts of hostility as would undermine the mutual 
confidences among states such as were essential if states at war were to return to the 
intervene. Le Droit des Gens, II.IV.₅₆. 
15　Article ₁, paragraph ₁ of the Charter of the United Nations affirms that the United Nations 
Organization is based in the principle of the sovereign equality of member states. The principle of the 
sovereign equality of states is also afﬁrmed as the Sixth Principle stipulated in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. As 
regarding the duty of non-intervention falling on states as to the area of the exclusive jurisdiction 
exercised by other states, and with this as considered as the corollary of the sovereignty and equality 
of states, the Declaration on Principles of International Law sets out as its Third Principle the duty of 
states not to intervene in matters as coming within the domestic jurisdiction of one another. 
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condition of peace, rather than to pursue war to the point where belligerent states were 
brought to total destruction. The specific acts to be prohibited, as to which Kant made 
reference, included the use of assassins and poison, breaches of agreements by belligerent 
states, and the instigation of treason in enemy states. The principle laid down in the sixth 
preliminary article had the standing of a strict prohibitive law, and so in consequence of this 
the various practices as subject to the terms of the article were, for Kant, to be outlawed 
with immediate effect.16
ii. 
 The sixth preliminary article of perpetual peace relates to the law of war. In the event, 
Kant expounded the law applying to the conduct of war in terms such that it was understood 
to occupy a central position in what he took to be the substantive law of nations. This is 
clear from the exposition of the principles of the law of nations that is provided in The 
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, where virtually the entire exposition of the subject is 
given over to the law of war and to the elaboration of its core principles. As Kant here 
explained the matter, the law of war, and hence the law of nations as such, was founded in 
the natural right of states to wage war as in defence of their rights and property. The right of 
states to wage war was a right that followed from what, for Kant, was the truism that states 
by nature stood as free and independent entities, and that the natural condition of the society 
formed as among free and independent states was to be thought of as a condition of war. 
This was so in the sense that the natural condition of the society of states was a non-juridical 
condition of society, where, by deﬁnition, there could exist no judicial procedures for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes among states as regarding their rights and property, and 
where the resort to war was available as the legitimate means by which states were to secure 
their rights against one another and to obtain redress for such injuries as were done to them. 
In consequence of it being a condition of war, as in the respects referred to, the natural 
society formed among states was to be understood as a condition of strict legal injustice.17 
16　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₉₆-₇. 
17　Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, The General Theory of Justice, Part II: Public Law, 
Section II: The Law of Nations, sub-sections ₅₃-₅₄, ₅₆. 
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 While Kant regarded the right of states to wage war as a natural right that was 
exercised in circumstances of strict legal injustice, he nevertheless held it to be a right that 
was restricted by a body of law that set out the substantive lawful rights of states in the 
waging of war. This body of law was the law of nations, and in The Metaphysical Elements 
of Justice Kant elaborated the particular rights that it provided for as under six distinct 
heads. 
 First, Kant considered the right of states to wage war in relation to their own subjects. 
Here, he insisted that states were to wage war only with the consent of the representatives of 
their own citizen-bodies.18 Second, there was the right of states to wage war with regard to 
other states. With this issue, Kant set down the various offences whose occurrence enabled 
states to claim a lawful justiﬁcation for the resort to war. The principal offence justifying 
war was an actual injury to the state, as brought about by the ﬁrst aggression of some other 
state or states. As well as the case of defence in the face of aggression, however, the state 
might also resort to war on account of some perceived threat to its own security, as where 
the military preparations of another state justiﬁed it in the waging of a war of prevention. In 
addition, the increase in the power of some state, as through its acquisition of new territory, 
might be construed by other states to give rise to a just cause of war, and with Kant taking 
this to point to the existence of the right of states to act to preserve the balance of power.19 
 Third, there were the rights of belligerent states during the course of a war. These were 
the rights that Kant saw as deriving from the idea that war was always to be prosecuted in 
conformity with principles of conduct that worked to preserve the possibility of belligerent 
states being able to abandon the condition of war, and to enter into a juridical condition of 
society. In Kant＇s explanation of them, the principles of state conduct at issue, here, served 
to set limits to the objects that might legitimately be pursued by states in the waging of war. 
So, for example, no war between independent states was to be a war aimed at the 
punishment of enemy states. Again, no war was to have as its aim the extermination of 
enemy states, or their subjugation. A war that was directed to the extermination or 
subjugation of an enemy state would necessarily result in the destruction of that state, and 
with the absorption of its population within the victorious state or their reduction to slavery. 
18　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₅. 
19　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₆. 
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Such a war was not to be reconciled with what Kant, as in this connection, identiﬁed to be 
the general principle of the law of nations. This was the principle as to the effect that states 
were to resort to war, as through the application of the use of force, in order to defend their 
rights and property, but not in order to make material acquisitions for themselves that would 
undermine other states as in consequence of the increase in their relative power. The 
discussion of the rights of belligerent states also included consideration of the practices that 
were to be prohibited in wartime, and with Kant condemning the use of assassins and poison 
and the other practices of the sort as excluded by the terms of the sixth preliminary article of 
perpetual peace. In addition, Kant maintained that belligerent states were not permitted to 
seize by force the private property of the subjects of vanquished enemy states.20 
 The fourth set of rights relating to war that Kant discussed were the rights of states on 
the conclusion of a war. In regard to this matter, Kant listed certain conditions that it was not 
permissible for a victorious state to include in a treaty of peace as concluded with a defeated 
enemy. Thus it was not permitted for a victorious state to demand compensation from a 
defeated enemy state in order to meet the costs of war, or to demand that it should forfeit its 
freedom and independence as through its being reduced to the status of a colony.21 Fifth, 
there were the rights of states at peace. These included the right of states to neutrality, and 
the right of states to form alliances for the purpose of mutual defence against internal and 
external aggression.22 Sixth, there were the rights of states in relation to an unjust enemy 
state. Kant cited, as the case of such an enemy, the state that acted in violation of the terms 
of treaty obligations. This state was unjust, Kant argued, for the reason that its publicly 
expressed will demonstrated that it acted in accordance with a principle of conduct which, if 
adopted by all states on a universal basis, would preclude the possibility of establishing 
international peace, and so prolong for all time the natural condition of war obtaining among 
states as by nature. All states were at liberty to unite against a state guilty of this injustice, 
and, where necessary, to impose on it a form of lawful constitutional order that would 
incline it to act for peace.23 
 Kant＇s statement of the principles of the law of war is further evidence of his looking 
20　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₇. 
21　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₈. 
22　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₉. 
23　Ibid., The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₆₀. 
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forward to subsequent developments in international law. Thus it was that he afﬁrmed such 
fundamental principles of current international law as those excluding wars of aggression, 
and wars aimed at conquest and the enslavement and colonization of peoples. At the same 
time, Kant on the law of war serves to underline his links with the previous writers on the 
law of nations. This is true as to Kant in his relation to the line of pre-modern just war 
theorists as represented by Augustine and Aquinas; and it is true also of Kant in his relation 
to Grotius and Vattel, as prominent among the modern secular natural law writers who 
contributed to the development of just war doctrine. 
 In the tradition of just war theorizing, there had been three essential conditions 
stipulated for justice in war. First, there was the condition of lawful authority. Thus it was 
that justice in war required that war should be waged by states only on the lawful authority 
of their sovereign rulers. Both Augustine and Aquinas underlined the condition of lawful 
authority, and it was made central by Grotius and Vattel in discussion of the category of war 
that they referred to as public war. The second condition for justice in war, as identiﬁed by 
these various writers, was the condition that war was to be waged by states only where there 
existed some just cause for war. The requirement of just cause, as to the waging of war, was 
recognized by Augustine and Aquinas, and later by Grotius and Vattel who, in explanation 
of the matter, saw the presence of a just cause for war as the basis and precondition for the 
exercise by states and rulers of the various rights of war. The third condition for justice in 
war was the condition of right intention. With this condition, it was provided that justice in 
war required that war should be waged by states only to the end of restoring a condition of 
peace that would, as such, constitute a just and lawful political order. The restoration of 
peace, as the proper lawful object of war, was upheld by Augustine and Aquinas; and the 
same was the case with Grotius and Vattel, who were to discuss this in terms of the 
establishing of peace as being the end that was implied in the undertaking of war by states. 
The condition of right intention, as thus understood, is notable in just war doctrine, as in the 
respect that it conﬁrmed the necessity that states should observe such rules and principles in 
the conduct of warfare as would allow for the return to peace: and hence conﬁrmed also the 
necessity that there should be laws adopted and followed by states that would serve to limit 
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and mitigate the harsher effects and consequences of war.24 
 Kant remained faithful to the just war tradition, as in his exposition of the law of 
nations as it applied to war, as through the recognition that he gave to lawful authority, just 
cause and the considerations bound up with the condition of right intention as the basic and 
necessary conditions for justice in war. So Kant maintained that the right of war was a 
sovereign right of states, and hence that war was to be waged by states only with the lawful 
authority of the ruler: albeit that he emphasized that the exercise by states of the right of war 
was to be conditional on the consent of the citizens as through their representatives. Kant 
also insisted that justice in war required that war was to be waged only where there existed 
some just cause for it, as witness here his picking out of defence against ﬁrst aggression as 
the principal justiﬁcation for war. There was also the afﬁrmation by Kant of the idea of right 
intention, as where this was thought of as the condition that war was to be waged in order to 
establish a peace based in law and justice. Thus it was in accordance with the terms of this 
condition that Kant excluded such practices in wartime as the use of assassins and poisons 
and breaches of agreements, in addition to his excluding, as unlawful, such wars as were 
directed towards the extermination or the subjugation of enemy states. 
 For all that Kant was faithful to the terms of the theorizing as adopted in the established 
just war tradition, there still remain signiﬁcant divergences on his part from certain of the 
key formulations that belong to it. This is true in regard to particular points of substantive 
doctrine, as is the case, most importantly, with the question of war and punishment. For 
Augustine and Aquinas, as well as for Grotius and Vattel, the three principal just causes for 
war had been identified as self-defence, the recovery of property and the punishment of 
states guilty of wrong-doing.25 The identiﬁcation by the just war thinkers of the punishment 
24　For Aquinas, and here following on from Augustine, as to the statement of lawful authority, just 
cause and right intention as conditions for the justice of war, see: Summa Theologiae, Secunda 
Secundae, Question ₄₀, article ₁. The three conditions for justice in war were given recognition to by 
Grotius, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, as with his discussion of the distinction between public war and 
private war (I.II.I-V), the just causes of war (II.I), and the rules and principles to be observed by 
belligerent states in order to moderate the harsh effects and consequences of war (III.XI-XVI). As 
regarding Vattel, there is discussion in Le Droit des Gens of the right to make war (III.I.₃-₄), the just 
causes of war (III.III), and the law relating to what it was permissible to do to the person of the 
enemy in a just war (III.VIII). 
25　For Aquinas, Grotius and Vattel on punishment of wrong-doing and the other principal just causes 
of war, see respectively: Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Question ₄₀, article ₁; De Jure Belli 
32
筑波法政第₆₄号（₂₀₁₅）
of wrong-doing as a just cause for war was informed by, and associated with, a quite speciﬁc 
view of war. The view of war at issue, here, was that of war as a means for the maintenance, 
regulation and enforcement of an objectively subsisting normative order among states, as 
where this order was assumed to stand as the basis for the determination of the justice of the 
claims of right as set forward by the belligerent states concerned. This view of war is to be 
found present with Augustine and Aquinas. It is present also with Grotius and Vattel, as is 
underlined by their afﬁrming of the doctrine, as integral to traditional just war theorizing, 
that in respect of the essential nature of its cause no war was to be thought of as being just 
on both sides.26 
 In the matter of the lawful justiﬁcation for the waging of war by states, Kant was clear 
that self-defence and the recovery of property stood as just causes for war. Nevertheless, he 
expressly denied that a war between independent states could be a war of punishment. For 
Kant, punishment presupposed a relationship obtaining as between a superior and an 
inferior. However, no such relationship obtained among independent states, with the 
consequence that no state could be thought of as waging a war whose object and justiﬁcation 
lay with the punishment of some other state. The relationship between superior and inferior 
as required for the right of punishment, Kant argued, was something that could exist only 
within the juridical form of society to be found in the civil state, as where a people were 
subject to a supreme political authority as exercising the various rights of sovereignty of 
which punishment was one. As for states at war, these, Kant emphasized, were to be 
regarded as co-existing in the natural condition of their mutual society, and hence in a non-
juridical condition of society where, by deﬁnition, there was present no lawful basis for the 
right of punishment.  
 Given that Kant saw states at war as standing to one another in a non-juridical 
condition of society, it was not open to him to adopt the view of war as adhered to by 
Grotius and Vattel and the earlier just war theorists. For Kant conceived of the international 
state of nature, as a state of war, in terms such that he was unable to think of war as a 
ac Pacis, II.I; Le Droit des Gens, III.III. 
26　It is to be noted that while Grotius and Vattel held that no war could be just on both sides with 
regard to its cause, they emphasized that a war might be considered just on both sides as with regard 
to its legal effects and consequences for the parties to it. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.XXIII.
XIII; Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, III.III.₃₉-₄₀. 
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legitimate means for the sustaining of an objective normative order holding among states, 
and to which reference might be made for the authoritative determination of the justice of 
the different claims of right as these were advanced by states at war. In consequence of this, 
Kant was also prevented from following Grotius and Vattel in their conviction as to the 
impossibility of the considering of war as capable of being just on both sides. As Kant 
explained it, the international state of nature, as a state of war, was a non-juridical condition 
of society, as where the rights of states were to be determined and secured not through 
binding principles of law and justice, but only through the right of the strongest. Thus it was 
that Kant insisted that the international state of nature was a non-juridical condition of 
society, as for the reason that there could be established within it no judicial procedures that 
were competent to provide for a conclusive determination of the justice of the claims of 
right as set forth by belligerent states. From this it followed that, as within the natural 
condition of the society holding among states, there could be no ﬁnal and fully objective 
determination of the justice of the cause of a war as such. As Kant put the matter in 
explaining the sixth preliminary article of perpetual peace, war was about the assertion of 
rights by force in a state of nature where there was no court competent to judge with lawful 
authority. If, therefore, a proper and reliable determination of the justice of the claims of 
states at war were to be looked for, then this would have to be a determination as based in, 
and proceeding from, the actual outcome of the war.27  
 Kant looked back to Hobbes in the view that he took of war as the natural condition of 
the society obtaining among states. For Hobbes had held that independent states, or 
commonwealths, were to be thought of as standing to one another in a state of nature, and 
with the state of nature being, as in his celebrated characterization of it, the condition of the 
war of all against all, as where there were established no authoritative institutions of 
government, no effective rule of law, and no determinate principles of justice and propriety.28 
Even so, Hobbes was still prepared to allow that there were certain laws that obtained in the 
27　For Kant on punishment as a right of sovereignty as belonging to and exercised by the ruler within 
the civil state, see: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, The General Theory of Justice, II.I: 
General Remarks on the Juridical Consequences arising from the Nature of the Civil Union, Section 
E. For Kant＇s arguments regarding punishment in regard to war and to the situation of states in the 
sphere of their mutual external relations, see: Perpetual Peace, p. ₉₆; The Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice, The General Theory of Justice, II.II.₅₇, p. ₁₂₀; II.II.₅₈, pp. ₁₂₁-₂. 
28　Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter XIII. 
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state of nature. These were the laws of nature, which laws Hobbes saw as setting out the 
essential principles of peaceful association among men: and, in this aspect, as imposing such 
fundamental duties as the duty to endeavour peace, the duty to set limits to the rights of war 
on a reciprocal basis, the duty to fulﬁl the terms of agreements entered into, and the duty to 
have disputes submitted to the judgment of independent arbitrators.29 For Hobbes, the laws 
of nature, as laws stating the principles of peace, were laws that he explained as having 
primary application to individual men, and hence as relating to the conditions for association 
among men as within the civil state. However, Hobbes also saw the laws of nature as 
applying to states and their rulers, and hence as serving to establish the normative 
framework for peace as among states and rulers. Indeed, Hobbes identified the law of 
nations as the laws of nature in their application to sovereign rulers, and, to the extent that 
he did so, then he placed himself squarely with Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel, as leading 
modern secular natural law writers, in their respective expositions of the law of nations.30 
 Kant stands in opposition to Hobbes for the reason that he thought of the gulf between 
the natural condition of the society of states, as a condition of continual war, and the 
juridical condition of the society of states, as a condition of peace based in laws, as being an 
absolute gulf, and not one that was to be overcome through appeal to laws which were 
understood to have their foundation in nature. Thus it was the view of Kant that if there was 
to be a normative order comprising laws making for peace among states, then this would 
have to be an order which it fell to states to bring into being – or, as he put it in Perpetual 
Peace, to institute on a formal basis – through some explicit act of their own. That is to say, 
for Kant, the normative order that was to embody the conditions for a peace among states 
based in law was an order whose foundations were to be explained not in reference to the 
concept of laws given in nature, but in terms of the will and agreement of the states to which 
this order had application.31 
29　Ibid., I.XIV-XV. 
30　For Hobbes on the law of nations as consisting in the laws of nature as applying to sovereign 
rulers, see: Leviathan, II.XXX, pp. ₂₃₁-₂. For a discussion by the present author of Hobbes as in 
relation to the question of the law of nations, see: Charles Covell, Hobbes, Realism and the Tradition 
of International Law (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ₂₀₀₄), especially 
Chapter ₂. 
31　For Kant on peace as a condition to be instituted, see: Perpetual Peace, p. ₉₈. 
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iii. 
 The insistence of Kant that peace based in law was a condition of society that had to be 
formally instituted serves to underline his break with Hobbes, and with the secular natural 
law thinkers such as Grotius and Vattel who stood within the just war tradition. For Grotius 
and Vattel, it had been assumed that war should be made subject to the constraints and 
limitations of law, and that the legal regulation of war was itself a precondition for war 
being concluded and a return made to the condition of peace. In the event, however, neither 
Grotius nor Vattel had been able to move from the position that there should be a law 
providing for justice in war, and towards the position that the full realization of a normative 
order based in law, as in its international application, required the establishing of a rule of 
law where war would cease to be resorted to by states and rulers as the legitimate means for 
the maintenance, regulation and enforcement of justice and as to their rights. 
 This was the decisive move that Kant made in his explanation of the juridical 
foundations of peace. For he assumed that if the relations between states were to be based in 
the rule of law, and peace secured through this, then it was not sufﬁcient merely that states 
should observe that part of the law of nations which deﬁned their rights and duties in the 
waging of war. The conviction of Kant as to this matter explains why it was that he came to 
argue that the extension of the rule of law to the international sphere required, and 
necessitated, nothing less than the permanent renunciation by states of war as the means for 
settling disputes about their rights, and the adoption by states of a juridical framework based 
in a rule of law that would provide for the determination of their rights under conditions of 
universal peace. It is because Kant associated the ideal of a peace based in law with the 
permanent renunciation of war by states that he understood a true peace based in law to be a 
perpetual peace. In the same way, it is because Kant conceived of perpetual peace as 
requiring that states should submit themselves to a juridical framework in the sphere of their 
mutual external relations, and so abandon the natural condition of their society, that he 
insisted that international peace was a condition of society that it was necessary that states 
should formally institute. 
 The juridical framework that Kant envisaged as necessary for the establishing of a 
perpetual peace was one that presupposed that states, and the individuals who comprised 
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them, should base their mutual relations in speciﬁc forms of lawful constitution. The forms 
of lawful constitution that Kant saw as essential for peace were the constitutions that he 
considered were to found the municipal law, the law of nations and the cosmopolitan law as 
the three parts of the public law. These constitutional orders Kant discussed in the three 
deﬁnitive articles of perpetual peace that were set down and explained in the second section 
of Perpetual Peace, and later in Part ₂ of The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. 
 The forms of lawful constitution that Kant was concerned with were thought of by him 
as providing for the instituting of peace. In this respect, the concern of Kant with 
constitutions, as the basis for peace, points, once again, to his anticipation of the future 
development of international law. For the formal institutionalization of relations among men 
and states in the international sphere was to come to be central to the later development of 
international law, and especially so during the twentieth century. Indeed, the legal-political 
principles that are embodied in the forms of lawful constitution that Kant afﬁrmed as being 
necessary for peace are principles that, to a large extent, have been incorporated into 
international law, or that stand as principles that relate to areas in international politics 
which are considered to be proper to be made subject to regulation through international 
law. The international law of the contemporary era remains a system of law that is based in 
the institution of the state. This is a feature of present international law that serves to render 
it consistent with the terms of what Kant argued for as being the law of peace. For the law 
of peace was a state-centred conception of law, and, through the municipal, international 
and cosmopolitan forms of public law pertaining to it and through the constitutional 
structures that were to found these different parts of the public law, the law of peace was 
such that it worked to secure and legitimate the institution of the state and to guarantee and 
preserve the rights of states that were essential to their sovereignty and hence to their 
freedom and independence. The state-centredness of the law of peace, as Kant expounded it, 
is something that is everywhere apparent in his specification of the forms of lawful 
constitution that he prescribed as making to establish a permanent international peace on a 
deﬁnitive basis. 
 The form of lawful constitution that Kant held was to found the municipal law 
maintained in the state was the republican form of civil constitution. The republican 
constitution was the subject of the ﬁrst deﬁnitive article of perpetual peace. The form of 
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government that, in Kant＇s explanation of the matter in Perpetual Peace, was required under 
the terms of the republican constitution was that of constitutional government as subject to 
the constraints and limitations as set through the rule of law. Thus the republican 
constitution provided for the formal separation of the legislative and executive powers of 
the state, and so thereby provided for the subordination of the executive power of rulership 
to the laws that were established as through the legislative power. For Kant, the legislative 
power in the state was sovereign, and with this meaning, as he understood it, that the 
sovereign power of legislation in the state was embodied in the people or citizen-body as a 
whole. Accordingly, the ruler of the state, as exercising the executive powers of government, 
was bound by the laws enacted by the citizen-body as sovereign, and hence was, in this 
sense, to be thought of as the representative of the sovereign will of the citizens in their 
collective aspect. 
 In Kant＇s view, then, the principle of representation was the very essence of republican 
constitutionalism. For the representative status of the ruler was here intrinsic to rulership, as 
where this was exercised through ofﬁces that were based in and constituted through public 
law. However, there was nothing about the ideal of representative government, as bound up 
with republican constitutionalism, that implied that the republican form of civil constitution 
demanded the adoption of the democratic form of government. On the contrary, Kant was 
clear that republican constitutionalism and democracy in government were fundamentally 
opposed as one to another: and with this being so for the reason that democracy promised 
that the citizen-body bearing the sovereign legislative power might hold and exercise 
executive power in the state. As a result, it was inevitable that the democratic form of 
government would collapse the separation of powers and that, in doing this, it would free 
the executive powers of rulership from subjection to law and thereby work to undermine the 
foundations of limited constitutional government. 
 The chief merit of the republican constitution, as in Kant＇s account of it, was not 
anything to do with the democratization of the institutions of state government, but rather 
the securing under the terms of the state constitution of the rights of individual citizens 
according to law. Speciﬁcally, the terms of the republican constitution were such that law 
and government in the state were to be based in the consent of the citizen-body; as so also 
were the rights and freedoms of citizens to be secured to them through a system of public 
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municipal law which applied to all citizens, as on an equal basis, and which thereby 
established the only conditions for the legitimate application of coercive force by the state 
against its citizens. The additional, and very particular merit, that Kant claimed for the 
republican constitution was that it stood as the constitution for peace. This was so, for Kant, 
as in the sense that the state that adopted the republican constitution would be likely to 
refrain from resorting to war. As Kant put it, the republican constitution was such that, under 
it, the citizen-body was able to determine whether or not the state was to opt for war, and, in 
his assessment of the matter, it was not likely that the citizen-body would willingly opt for 
this while knowing of their own liability to suffer the direct effects and consequences of 
war. 
 There is great signiﬁcance attaching to the argument of Kant that the adoption by states 
of the constitutional form of government, as the basis for their internal domestic political 
organization, would incline states to maintain peace among themselves and so, as a result of 
this, incline them to submit to the constraints and limitations of law as it had application in 
the international sphere. For this argument underlines what Kant saw, and insisted on, as 
being the essential inter-connectedness of domestic state law and politics and international 
law and politics. Even so, it remains here vital to understand that the progress of states 
towards the ideal of the constitutional form of government, in Kant＇s own sense of it, was 
something that was to depend on the development of the internal domestic political 
organization as taking place within states, and as in accordance with their own will and 
agency. It was not something that was to be brought about through the will and agency of 
the international community, as, say, through the mechanisms of international legal 
regulation or those of international coercive power. This was so because Kant＇s claims for 
the republican constitution, as the constitution for peace, were claims that he set out in the 
context of the claims that he made regarding the basic substantive principles of the law of 
nations as such; and, as it has been explained, the law of nations, for Kant, provided that 
states were to remain free from all forcible external interference with their constitution and 
government. Thus was Kant＇s prescription of the republican form of civil constitution, as a 
deﬁnitive condition for the establishing of perpetual peace, qualiﬁed by his insistence that 
international law proper was to work to entrench the institution of the state as a free and 
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independent, and hence sovereign, entity.32 
 The second of the forms of lawful constitution that Kant prescribed in Perpetual Peace, 
as necessary for permanent peace among men and states, was the constitution that he held 
was to found the law of nations. This constitution was to be embodied in a federation of free 
states, and it was the subject-matter of the second deﬁnitive article of perpetual peace. The 
federation of free states, as a form of constitutional relationship among states, was explained 
by Kant such that, as within the framework of the law of peace, it was understood to work to 
preserve the institution of the state in its character as a sovereign entity, and thereby to 
guarantee the freedom and independence from external control and higher authority that 
were essential to the sovereignty of the state as an institution. 
 Thus it was that Kant insisted that the federation of free state was not to stand as a 
world state or an international state, and hence that the establishing of the federation was not 
to require the subordination of states to international governmental institutions bearing 
powers analogous to the constitutional powers such as belonged to the institution of state 
government. For as Kant characterized it, the federation was to provide the constitutional 
foundation for a body of law that, by virtue of being international law, possessed application 
to states considered as entities which were free and independent, and which were therefore 
not to be brought together to form some unitary political authority or institutional structure. 
Again, states were free and independent in that they were based in a lawful form of internal 
constitution. For this reason, states were to be thought of as being properly exempt from 
subjection to the external coercive rights and powers that were embodied within the civil 
constitution, and as being there necessary for the maintenance of the municipal law as 
32　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₉₉-₁₀₂. The arguments that Kant set out for the republican 
constitution, as in relation to issues to do with the subject of international peace, connect his thought 
to what is now referred to as the democratic peace theory: and with this being so as in the respect that 
Kant envisaged the constitutional form of government within states as serving to promote and to 
secure peace between states in the international sphere. However, it is to be emphasized, here, that 
Kant distinguished clearly between the principles of republican constitutionalism, as such, and the 
principles of democratic government. In addition, it has to be observed that there is nothing to link 
Kant to the doctrine of liberal humanitarian interventionism with which democratic peace theory is 
sometimes associated. For what is often pointed to as being a seminal contribution to the core agenda 
and development of democratic peace theory, see: Michael W. Doyle, ＇Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs＇, Philosophy and Public Affairs, ₁₂ (Summer ₁₉₈₃), pp. ₂₀₅-₃₅; ₁₂ (Fall ₁₉₈₃), pp. 
₃₂₃-₅₃. 
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obtaining within states. The exempting of states from subjection to external coercive rights 
and powers was crucial to their freedom and independence, and it was precisely the securing 
of the freedom and independence of states, as understood in terms of this exemption, that 
Kant took to stand as the end and purpose of the federation of free states. 
 In the explanation of the idea of the federation of free states as set out in Perpetual 
Peace, Kant pointed to how the essential and deﬁning feature of the federation, as a lawful 
constitutional structure, was to be taken as lying not in any international governmental 
institutions, but in the treaty agreement among states through which the federation was 
brought into being. The treaty establishing the federation was to be a peace treaty, except 
that it was to be a treaty not to end some particular war but, rather, a treaty that was to put 
an end to war as such and on a permanent basis. Hence it was a treaty that was to involve an 
undertaking by the states that were the parties to it to abide by the terms of the law which 
applied to them, and which stood as the condition for the initiating and preservation of 
lasting peace. The emphasis that Kant placed on the treaty establishing the federation of free 
states, as the constitutional foundation for the law of nations, underlines how he saw the law 
of nations as law that was based in, and that derived its normative force from, the will and 
agreement of states. Likewise, Kant＇s speciﬁcation of the terms of the treaty relating to the 
federation, as a treaty committing the parties to the permanent renunciation of war, 
underlines how Kant moved beyond the standpoint speciﬁc to traditional just war theorizing. 
This was so in the respect that Kant saw the treaty as creating a constitutional relationship 
among states where war was no longer to be available, or to be resorted to, as a proper 
means for the enforcing of law and for the securing of the lawful rights of states. 
 If Kant insisted that the federation of free states was not an international state or an 
institution for international government, and if he was clear that the essence of the federation 
lay in the treaty agreement establishing it, there remains nothing about his account of the 
federation to indicate that he would have excluded institutional arrangements for the 
structuring of inter-state relations as such. To be sure, Kant would certainly have had little 
difﬁculty with accepting institutional arrangements for facilitating the peaceful settlement of 
disputes among states as in accordance with law. No doubt this is why Kant＇s projected 
federation of free states has sometimes been linked (erroneously, in fact) with such later 
international organizations as the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization. 
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However, this in no way qualifies what is the fundamental position that Kant argued for 
through his appeal to the ideal of a federation of free states: that is, the position that peace 
among states would have to depend not on the presence of international organizations 
exercising governmental or quasi-governmental powers, but rather on the acceptance by 
states and governments of the rule of law on a voluntary basis, and on their acceptance of a 
legal regime committed to the maintenance of the institution of the state and the 
maintenance of the freedom and independence as essential to them and to their 
sovereignty.33 
 The third form of lawful constitution that Kant called for in Perpetual Peace was the 
cosmopolitan constitution, which constitution stood as the subject-matter of the third 
definitive article of perpetual peace. The cosmopolitan constitution was an ideal form of 
constitutional order that Kant conceived of as providing for the juridical union of men and 
nations as in accordance with the terms of the cosmopolitan law. As Kant explained it, the 
cosmopolitan law was the law that applied in the regulation of trade and commerce among 
men and nations in the international sphere. However, the cosmopolitan law was much more 
than the law of international trade and commerce. For Kant characterized it such that the 
cosmopolitan law was understood to comprise a system of law that was to provide for the 
universal recognition of the equal legal status and legal personality of all men and all 
nations. It was in these terms that Kant made reference to the concept of cosmopolitan law 
to condemn such abuses in the international politics of his own times as colonialism and 
slavery. 
 It is clear that, for Kant, the cosmopolitan law was to facilitate trade and commerce 
among men and nations, and that the interdependence among men and nations as resulting 
from the spread of international trade and commerce was to be thought of as working to 
promote the cause of international peace. It is clear also that Kant envisaged the 
cosmopolitan law as working to promote peace as through the form of juridical 
33　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₁₀₂-₅. Further to Kant on the federation of free states as the 
constitutional foundation for the law of nations, see: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, The 
General Theory of Justice, II.II.₆₁. For an excellent discussion of Kant and the place occupied by the 
idea of the federation of free states within his international thought generally, and as where there is 
underlined the opposition of Kant to projects for establishing a world state or a system of 
international government, see: F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in 
the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ₁₉₆₃), Chapter ₄.
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egalitarianism that it was to bring to the condition of international society: that is, through 
its providing for the universal recognition of the legal status and legal personality of men 
and nations. In both respects, the cosmopolitan law was something presented by Kant as 
establishing juridical ties and inter-connections among men and nations in the international 
sphere such as would serve to reduce, and indeed to put an end to, the incidence of war at 
the level of the relations among states and their governments. 
 It has been argued that the appeal of Kant to cosmopolitan law indicates that he was a 
revolutionist with respect to international politics, as in the sense of being a theorist who 
looked forward to the overthrowing of the international order, as an order based in states, 
and the establishing in its place of a universal cosmopolitan society. As against this 
revolutionist interpretation, there are Kant＇s own arguments about the cosmopolitan law. For 
these, in fact, do nothing to suggest any doubts on his part regarding the necessity of the 
maintenance of states as the institutional foundation of both internal domestic and 
international political organization. Thus it was that Kant saw the cosmopolitan law as being 
grounded in, and as deriving from, the right of universal hospitality: that is, the right of men 
not to be treated with hostility by the inhabitants of the foreign lands into which they 
entered. However, the cosmopolitan right to hospitality was the right of a guest; it was not, 
as Kant insisted, the right of resort or settlement. In consequence, the right that belonged to 
men under cosmopolitan law was not a right that Kant thought of as working to undermine 
state institutions with regard to their territorial and jurisdictional competences, or with 
regard to the exclusiveness of the juridical relationships obtaining among them and their 
respective citizen-bodies. Beyond this, there is the consideration that the cosmopolitan law 
and its related form of lawful constitution comprised only one part of the system of law that 
Kant presented as making for peace among men and states. As such, the cosmopolitan law 
supplemented, but without negating, the municipal law of states, and with the latter 
presupposing the existence of states and pointing to the adoption by states of the republican 
constitution as the condition for both peace and justice. At the same time, the cosmopolitan 
law supplemented, but again without negating, the law of nations as the law that underwrote 
the institution of the state, and that served to deﬁne and validate the rights and duties which 
were essential to the freedom and independence of states as in their character as sovereign 
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entities.34 
 There is little question that the principles that are embodied in the forms of lawful 
constitution that Kant commended, as the foundations for the three parts of public law, are 
principles that receive recognition in current international law. Thus in proposing the 
adoption by states of the republican form of civil constitution as the precondition for peace, 
Kant recognized that factors pertaining to the internal domestic political organization of 
states were crucial to the establishing of an effective rule of law to regulate the relations 
among states in the international sphere. The form of state constitution that Kant endorsed 
was one that served to guarantee the fundamental rights of men as citizens. To the extent 
that Kant saw international peace based in law as depending on the acceptance by states of 
the republican constitutional form of government, as this secured the rights of men as 
citizens, then it is plain that he looked forward to the present era in international law as 
where the principles of human rights have come to be acknowledged as setting benchmark 
standards for the internal domestic political order of states which relate directly to the 
prospects for international peace. In calling for the federation of free states as the 
constitutional basis for the law of nations, Kant underlined that the law of nations required 
the instituting of some speciﬁc international organization of states whose concern was to lie 
with the maintaining of that body of law. Here, too, Kant looked forward to the present era 
in international law, as where it has come to be accepted that international peace and order 
must depend not only on the existence of law as such, but also on the existence of 
international institutions that are charged with its actual maintenance. Finally, there is the 
cosmopolitan law as the precondition for international peace. With this matter, Kant once 
again looked forward to the present era in international law, and as an era that has come to 
be distinguished by the forming of regimes for trade and commerce among men and nations, 
the afﬁrming of decolonization and the equality and self-determination of peoples, and the 
commitment to the recognition of the universal application of the fundamental rights of men 
34　Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. ₁₀₅-₈. As concerning Kant on cosmopolitan law, see also: The 
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, The General Theory of Justice, Part II: Public Law, Section III: 
World Law, sub-section ₆₂. For the revolutionist interpretation of Kant and his international thought, 
as weighted towards its cosmopolitan component, see: Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
of Order in World Politics (₁₉₇₇), ₂nd edition (London: Macmillan, ₁₉₉₅), Chapter ₂, pp. ₂₃-₆. 
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and nations.35 
 With all of this said, it is to be observed, in conclusion, that within the framework of 
the law of peace, as Kant set this out, the principles embodied in the forms of lawful 
constitution that he projected as being necessary for a lasting peace among men and states, 
as on a deﬁnitive basis, stood as restricted by, and subject to, the principles that he saw as 
comprising the essential substance of the law of nations. These, of course, were principles 
that he expounded such that they were to be taken as serving to entrench the institution of 
the state as a free and independent, and hence sovereign, entity. Thus for Kant and as from 
his own distinctive standpoint in international thought, the principles of republican 
constitutionalism remained qualiﬁed by the terms of the law of nations as this provided for 
the right of states to be free from forcible external interference with matters to do with their 
constitution and government. Then again, the principles of international federalism remained 
qualified by the consideration that no international federation of states was to act to the 
detriment of states as to the freedom and independence integral to their sovereignty. Moving 
beyond this, the principles of the cosmopolitan law, as this concerned freedom of trade and 
commerce and as it promoted juridical egalitarianism among men and nations, remained 
everywhere qualified as by the rights of states. In the now on-going situation in the 
development of international law, the rights of states are such that they may well be thought 
of as standing in a competitive relation to the deﬁning ends of constitutional government 
and the rights of men as citizens. So, too, may the rights of states be thought of as 
competitive with the deﬁning ends of international institutions and their promotion, and with 
the deﬁning ends as to do with the commercial interdependence of men and nations, and 
with the equal and universal recognition of the lawful rights and personality of men and 
35　As to the current international law on human rights, there is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (₁₉₄₈). In regard to the current law relating to international organizations, as in connection 
with Kant and the federation of free states, there is, of course, the United Nations Charter; but there 
is also, and arguably more relevant as to its institutional implications, the duty laid on states to settle 
disputes by peaceful means that is stipulated as the Second Principle given in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. With 
the Declaration, the Third Principle, stipulating the duty on states to co-operate with one another, and 
the Fourth Principle, as stipulating the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
conform, as to their substance and application, with the sense and meaning belonging to the idea of 
the cosmopolitan law in the form that Kant presented it. For the text of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, see: Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law, pp. ₂₅₅-₆₁. 
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nations. In the sense that this is so, then these considerations must serve to underline the 
relevance of Kant to the understanding of the contemporary predicaments in international 
law and international relations. And so also is it underlined, and as in accordance with Kant＇s 
own view of the matter, how and why it is that the state continues to present itself as an 
institution that is both central and yet problematic as in respect of the international political 
order.36
(Associate Professor, 
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba)
36　Looking back to January ₂₀₀₀ when this paper was delivered in its original form, it is now all the 
more evident that Kant provides a corrective to the sort of arguments that became fashionable in the 
₁₉₉₀s following the end of the Cold War, and as to the effect that the centrality of the state would be 
diminished in consequence of the then identiﬁed newly emerging factors as within the international 
political order. For an indication of this line of direction with the relevant theorizing going on at that 
time, see for example: Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ₁₉₉₆). In retrospect, it is also fully evident to 
what extent the course of events in world politics since January ₂₀₀₀ has served to confirm the 
necessity, and the inescapability, of the state and state institutions in the current and prospective 
condition of politics and society in both the domestic and international spheres. For the views of the 
present author on some of the different aspects of this question, see: Charles Covell and Shahzadi 
Covell, ＇Administrative Law and Civil Society in the People＇s Republic of China＇, Journal of 
International Public Policy, ₃₀ (September ₂₀₁₂), pp. ₁-₅₁.  

